Try to notice-in all your thoughts, sensations, and direct encounters-the objects and ‘outside-standers’ that make appearance meaningful. For each object encountered or referred to, note it and embrace it in its immediate givenness as being part of ‘you’. You can do this both by saying to yourself, “That too is ‘I’,” and by extending your sense of located awareness to embrace the apparently separate and distant object.This exercise helps to counteract the tendency to polarize experience, which creates a self that is cut off from the rest of reality. It might at first seem to set up a monomaniacal selfishness, but actually, if practiced carefully, it will undermine the idea of a solid and continuous ‘self’. The exercise might also seem to cultivate confusion between things themselves and thoughts about these things and about the world. But this is not the case. By initially forcing the subject and object together in this way, we can soon progress to the perception of a ‘time’ which naturally gives the subject and object as together. This process also shows the felt difference between the thought about a thing and the ‘thing itself’-between the reference and its referent-in a new light. We can progress from an artificial intimacy to an uncontrived one, and further, to an intimacy which simply is and which involves neither a self nor an object. This intimacy does not reach out to things elsewhere, nor does it assimilate them all in an ordinary location ‘here’.
Try to notice-in all your thoughts, sensations, and direct encounters-the objects and ‘outside-standers’ that make appearance meaningful. For each object encountered or referred to, note it and embrace it in its immediate givenness as being part of ‘you’. You can do this both by saying to yourself, “That too is ‘I’,” and by extending your sense of located awareness to embrace the apparently separate and distant object.This exercise helps to counteract the tendency to polarize experience, which creates a self that is cut off from the rest of reality. It might at first seem to set up a monomaniacal selfishness, but actually, if practiced carefully, it will undermine the idea of a solid and continuous ‘self’. The exercise might also seem to cultivate confusion between things themselves and thoughts about these things and about the world. But this is not the case. By initially forcing the subject and object together in this way, we can soon progress to the perception of a ‘time’ which naturally gives the subject and object as together. This process also shows the felt difference between the thought about a thing and the ‘thing itself’-between the reference and its referent-in a new light. We can progress from an artificial intimacy to an uncontrived one, and further, to an intimacy which simply is and which involves neither a self nor an object. This intimacy does not reach out to things elsewhere, nor does it assimilate them all in an ordinary location ‘here’.
