Thinking of things” is but a special way of dealing with them; but, as is obvious, it is a secondary manner of doing so and thus presupposes another [i.e., the primordial one]. The fundamental error—the “intellectualist” error—committed in Greece and modern Europe is tantamount to presupposing the opposite and to regarding one’s intellectual manner of relating to things as one’s primordial way of living. Descartes thus dared to define a human being, that is, the one living or “self,” as une chose qui pense d’autres choses [“a thing that thinks of other things”]. That’s done it! As if living were just being engaged in thinking of things! What about stumbling on them?
Thinking of things” is but a special way of dealing with them; but, as is obvious, it is a secondary manner of doing so and thus presupposes another [i.e., the primordial one]. The fundamental error—the “intellectualist” error—committed in Greece and modern Europe is tantamount to presupposing the opposite and to regarding one’s intellectual manner of relating to things as one’s primordial way of living. Descartes thus dared to define a human being, that is, the one living or “self,” as une chose qui pense d’autres choses [“a thing that thinks of other things”]. That’s done it! As if living were just being engaged in thinking of things! What about stumbling on them?
